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September 28, 2001

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DR. GROSS: The date is 28 September 2001. I'm Dr. Charles J. Gross, the Air Guard Historian in the National Guard Bureau. I will be interviewing MAJ Dan Caine of the 113th Fighter Wing concerning the terrorist attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001 and the role of the wing in responding to those attacks.

Major Caine, would you please identify yourself for the historical record and what your assignment is here at the 113th?

MAJ CAINE: Sure. It's MAJ Dan Caine. I go by "Raisin" and I am the Chief of Weapons and Tactics at the 121st Fighter Squadron, 113th Wing, District of Columbia Air National Guard. And I'm an AGR [Active Guard/Reserve] out here full-time.

DR. GROSS: Okay. For we laymen, what does a Weapons and Tactics person do?

MAJ CAINE: I'm the -- I'm a graduate of the Fighter Weapons School at Nellis Air Force Base and I'm responsible for the tactical expertise in the squadron. I'm the Chief Instructor Pilot (inaudible) the tactical guidance to that leadership and the squadron pilots.

DR. GROSS: What was your military background before you came here to the wing?

MAJ CAINE: 1990 graduate of Virginia Military Institute, active duty for a year. Then the Air Force started banking pilots, so I put out 85 resumes and cover letters to every guard fighter -- Guard and reserve fighter unit in the country. Hired by the New York Guard, a member of the 174th Fighter Wing up at Syracuse for five-and-a-half years, mostly as a full-time technician. I then moved down here in summer of '98 as an AGR been here since.

DR. GROSS: What attracted you to the Guard in the first place?

MAJ CAINE: The chance to -- well, initially, the chance to fly airplanes, as I wasn't going to sit at a desk in the active duty. And the fact that you could actually control a little bit of your own destiny as oppose to active duty for -- you get to live in one place, be fairly confident you're going to fly one airplane unless the unit converted and be able to make some decisions with your own life instead of moving every three years.

DR. GROSS: Where were you and what were you doing on the 11th of September when or just before the World Trade Center towers were attacked?

MAJ CAINE: Right before that, I was a SOF that morning, the Supervisor of Flying. I was responsible for safe flying operation in our ops desk at the south end of the

building. We had three airplanes airborne, doing a conventional, basic surface attack sortie with practice bombs. So, those airplanes were airborne.

And we were sitting in our scheduling office, getting ready to go to a scheduling meetings when one of our intel -- intel folks came in and said an airplane had just hit the World Trade Center.

DR. GROSS: Where were the three aircraft? Where was the range they were working?

MAJ CAINE: The range is in -- right -- right at the southern edge of Virginia, northern edge of North Carolina in a place called Dare County, North Carolina, a range down there.

DR. GROSS: Okay. What kind of armament do they have?

MAJ CAINE: Again, they had practice bombs and practice 20 millimeter ammunition.

DR. GROSS: Okay. What are practice bombs?

MAJ CAINE: It's a small, 25-pound bomb with a small non-lethal, obviously, shotgun charge in the front end and it emanates white smoke when it hits, so it -- a spotting charger type. A 20-millimeter ammunition is a training round. It's just a lead round. We'll fire out of the front of the Gatling gun on the F-16. (Inaudible) weapons effects when it hits the target.

DR. GROSS: So, what kind of effect, if any, would it have had on an airliner?

MAJ CAINE: Very little other than, obviously, incapacitating in -- but there would have been no explosion. A bullet like that would have gone through an airliner and kept on going. It would have -- it would have damaged it, no question, but --

DR. GROSS: It would be difficult to bring down an airliner with a round like that.

MAJ CAINE: Well, unless it was well-placed.

DR. GROSS: Okay.

MAJ CAINE: An engine, for example.

DR. GROSS: Okay. When or why did you become aware that something other than a tragic accident might have happened in New York City?

MAJ CAINE: Well, along with the rest of the country, I was watching television. As -- as myself and my fellow fighter pilots in the squadron were in the -- in the lounge watching CNN, we saw the second airplane attack the World Trade Center. Clearly, little or no doubt that this was not an accident at that point. (Inaudible.)

DR. GROSS: What actions did you take at that point?

MAJ CAINE: Myself and LTC Mark Sasserville (phonetic), who is the Operations officer here also, full-time, went from the lounge to the Operations desk and got on the phone with -- with the air traffic control tower here at Andrews, because we thought

we would have trouble recovering those three fighters on the range. And that was our initial primary concern.

As we are talking -- as I'm talking to the ATC control tower here at Andrews, I asked the Tower Chief, does he think he would have any trouble recovering those fighters? And his response is, "I don't know, but we just had a request for fighters over -- over D.C. from the Secret Service."

DR. GROSS: Okay. About what time was that?

MAJ CAINE: That is probably around 9:25, 9:30 in the morning, prior to the Pentagon being hit.

DR. GROSS: Okay. You all have some logs that we could look at and make some copies or something and get a look at these times later?

MAJ CAINE: We have a copy of the briefing that --

DR. GROSS: Okay.

MAJ CAINE: -- I'll be glad to give you, which --

DR. GROSS: Okay.

MAJ CAINE: -- has all the times and what (inaudible) would be, a series of documents that chronologically lists the events (inaudible).

DR. GROSS: Okay.

MAJ CAINE: I may -- you know, I look at the slides and tell the time, so those are more accurate (inaudible).

DR. GROSS: So, the Secret Service was talking to the controller? I'm sorry, I kind of lost the thread in there.

MAJ CAINE: Mm-hmm. The Secret Service somehow put a - - I'm not sure how that node got to the tower, but when the tower told me that, I hung up the phone and called our contact at the Secret Service, which, due to our -- our unique location, we -- you know, fairly healthy relationship with them.

DR. GROSS: Okay. This is a White House detail?

MAJ CAINE: This is the Washington Field Office detail initially.

DR. GROSS: Okay.

MAJ CAINE: We'll ultimately talk to the -- to the White House Joint Operations Center, the JOC as they call it, which is the primary OPR for protection of the President (inaudible).

DR. GROSS: Okay. So, what did you all talk about at that point with the Secret Service?

MAJ CAINE: I spoke with a gentleman, Special Agent Ken Boshamp (phonetic), and I said -- and I know him because he's been out here before, "Do you really have a request for fighters over Washington, D.C.?" At that time, he didn't have any knowledge of that and he said, "I'll call you back."

DR. GROSS: Okay.

MAJ CAINE: Meanwhile, we're continuing to work the recovery issues associated with those other airplanes and about, I think, 9:37 in the morning is where the airplane hit the -- hit the Pentagon and we were watching that on CNN.

DR. GROSS: Okay.

MAJ CAINE: At that point, clearly, the excitement level, if you will, with everybody involved, whether it be the air traffic control tower, the Secret Service, or whomever goes up about 12 notches.

DR. GROSS: Okay. And where were the aircraft and what was happening then?

MAJ CAINE: The airplanes are -- have -- have left Dare County range. They took off at 8:30 local, from Andrews.

DR. GROSS: From here, okay.

MAJ CAINE: They were on the range about 9 o'clock local for about 15 or 20 minutes. About 9:20, they're in the Kiwi (phonetic) refueling track, which shifts directly over Dare County range. And they are on recovery about 9:45 to 9:50 in the morning.

DR. GROSS: For recovery, what does that mean? Just landing?

MAJ CAINE: Just to come back to land.

DR. GROSS: Landing, okay. Then what happened next?

MAJ CAINE: We -- we got a phone call not too long after -- after the Pentagon had been hit from Agent Boshamp, saying "Get anything you can airborne," basically, as -- as quick as you can.

At that point, our maintenance folks have -- prior to this, I've actually brought them into the building and I've said, "Get us some airplanes ready right now," and they have begun to kick into action and they're awesome on the job that they did on -- on the 11th of September.

With -- they were notified about 10 o'clock. They were initially kind of given a heads-up a little bit earlier than that, "Hey, I think we may need some airplanes." Officially, they were notified around 10:00, 9:50, 10 o'clock. Had two air-to-air airplanes or F-16s with only a center-line fuel tank on them ready in about 10 to 12 minutes. It was amazing.

DR. GROSS: How were they armed?

MAJ CAINE: Only with 510 rounds of training ammunition on the first two. Same tactical issue for stopping someone as I mentioned earlier, not -- not the most effective (inaudible).

DR. GROSS: Do you all keep live ammunition?

MAJ CAINE: Yes, we do and we -- at -- at around the same time as we said we need airplanes ready to go, I called our bomb dump and told Master Sergeant Dave Bowman (phonetic) to uncrate our live missiles that we have over there in case we

needed them for the war reserve, its our war reserve material we deployed somewhere.

And those missiles were brought over and -- and started to be uploaded on a jet about 10:35 to 10:40 in the morning. It's about a two-mile drive. You have to drive around the south.

DR. GROSS: Okay. Meanwhile, back -- what else was going on your aircraft that were recovering from the training range?

MAJ CAINE: Those jets are allowed to enter the air -- our Class Bravo, Class B air space around Washington, call it a -- call it a 30-mile bubble around Washington for lack of a better way to put it.

DR. GROSS: Yeah.

MAJ CAINE: They're allowed to enter and they land the first three air -- they land probably around 10:25 in the morning. And immediately upon taxiing back, the flight lead, the airplane's call sign is "Bully One," is directed to get airborne again immediately and CAP [i.e., combat air patrol] over Georgetown. They think there's an airplane coming down the river.

So, he will land, roll to the end of the runway, taxi all the way back down to the approach end and take right back off.

DR. GROSS: How much -- I mean, he had the training rounds. How much fuel did he have?

MAJ CAINE: About 2,500 pounds. He had enough gas to orbit for a little while there.

DR. GROSS: For a little while?

MAJ CAINE: Yeah.

DR. GROSS: Okay.

MAJ CAINE: He's not a player for very long and he's only airborne for about 20 to 30 minutes.

DR. GROSS: But he does get airborne?

MAJ CAINE: He does get airborne. And I'm only talking to our piece of this.

DR. GROSS: Yeah.

MAJ CAINE: There's other pieces happening at the same time. The Fargo, 119th Fighter Wing, alert det, which -- you should talk to those guys --

DR. GROSS: Yeah.

MAJ CAINE: -- and get their side of the story. But they are -- they are airborne and over Washington at this point in time about 9:49 in the morning.

DR. GROSS: In what, two aircraft?

MAJ CAINE: Three airplanes.

DR. GROSS: Three aircraft from down there, okay.

MAJ CAINE: Yeah.

DR. GROSS: And meanwhile, what was going on back here at 113th?

MAJ CAINE: As -- as Bully One takes off again, CAPS 1 and 2, Lieutenant Colonel Sasserville, the OPS officer, and Lieutenant Heather Penny, one of our young -- young Lieutenants, are briefed and are out in the jets. Myself and Captain Brandon Rasmussen (phonetic), who is a active duty guy under a program called LimEx or Limited Experience for Total Force Absorption Program, TFAP (phonetic) --

DR. GROSS: Okay.

MAJ CAINE: An active duty guy here with us for a couple years, young guy, wing man. All four of us are out on the ramp waiting for the jets to be full up, ready to go. Caps 1 and 2, Colonel Sasserville and Lieutenant Penny, take off shortly after that single F-16 takes off at 10:42 in the morning.

DR. GROSS: Okay. How are they armed?

MAJ CAINE: Just with the gun. Those are the two airplanes (inaudible).

DR. GROSS: The gun -- oh, they're coming -- recovering from -- yeah.

MAJ CAINE: No, these are the two air-to-air airplanes that maintenance built up for us.

DR. GROSS: Okay. Just with the gun and --

MAJ CAINE: Just --

DR. GROSS: -- the training rounds?

MAJ CAINE: Just with a gun and with the training rounds.

DR. GROSS: Okay, okay.

MAJ CAINE: At 11:09, I'll take off with my wingman with 510 bullets of training [ammo], but we have two live missiles on each airplane.

DR. GROSS: Okay. Then what happened after that?

MAJ CAINE: Well, the first -- the first folks, CAPS 1 and 2, Colonel Sasserville gets airborne and starts to set up a tactical problem, solve it if you will. We have a lot of airplanes travelling around, going into Dulles and trying to get into National.

The National Command Authority has directed all airplanes will land, so you are hearing that in the background. And it is the full up fog of -- fog of war, if you will, but nobody is shooting at anybody, thank goodness.

Colonel Sasserville will set up a defensive counter air position, which I'm not going to talk to unless you want to classify this tape.

DR. GROSS: Well, that's fine. We can classify it.

MAJ CAINE: Okay. Well, we put, basically, a 360-degree threat axis. We don't know where the airliners would come from. And at the same time, we told our intel officer, who you met back there --

DR. GROSS: Yeah.

MAJ CAINE: -- to go find out what the heck's going on.

DR. GROSS: Yeah.

MAJ CAINE: And he is in touch with NSA, DIA, CIA, the FBI, FAA. All these different agencies, he's on the STU-III phone back there, trying to sort out what's going on. And we have SA, situational awareness, on United Airlines flight 93, that they are potentially tracking south.

DR. GROSS: That's the one that eventually crashed, the one --

MAJ CAINE: In Pennsylvania.

DR. GROSS: Okay.

MAJ CAINE: We also have a detection of a KLM flight over the Atlantic that they think is hijacked, an additional flight which ends up, I believe, landing in Canada. I don't remember the airline, but --

DR. GROSS: Okay. That's separate from the KLM?

MAJ CAINE: Separate from the KLM and then an airplane coming out of the Pacific that they think possibly is hijacked too.

DR. GROSS: Okay.

MAJ CAINE: All of which have the fuel to make it to Washington, D.C. and we've obviously seen a clear-cut, coherent tactic, if you will, underway from the hijackers. But we

continue to CAP Bully One, the single airplane that took off that had landed and then taken back off again. He was only airborne for about 20 to 30 minutes and he'll come back and land.

DR. GROSS: Okay.

MAJ CAINE: Caps 1 and 2 are running consecutive intercepts along with me and our --

DR. GROSS: Intercepting on what?

MAJ CAINE:

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(a)

DR. GROSS: So, how did you -- I mean, how -- what tactic did you use for those aircraft?

MAJ CAINE:

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(a)

DR. GROSS: Okay. And were you communicating with them by radio or --

MAJ CAINE: They weren't talking to anybody.

DR. GROSS: They weren't talking?

MAJ CAINE: No, and that's why they would get intercepted. If they were not talking to Washington National -- Reagan National Control Tower or Reagan National Approach --

DR. GROSS: Yeah.

MAJ CAINE: -- then they would get intercepted by the fighters. And our primary communications right now is with Reagan National Approach. They were doing great work (inaudible).

DR. GROSS: Okay. So, I mean, how did these other aircraft react? You're probably not used to seeing an F-16.

MAJ CAINE: Well, they turn away and they land and they listen to what ATC, Air Traffic Control, is telling them.

DR. GROSS: Okay. What were your Rules of Engagement [ROE] and how did they change if at all that morning?

MAJ CAINE: Well, if we're going to talk about ROE, then the tape is definitely secret.

DR. GROSS: That's fine. We'll stamp it and put it in a bag.

MAJ CAINE: We'll double-wrap it for you.

DR. GROSS: Okay.

MAJ CAINE: The -- Sir, the initial Rules of Engagement were read to us from the White House Joint Operations Center, the Secret Service, from Vice President Cheney --

DR. GROSS: Yeah.

MAJ CAINE: -- to the Joint Operations Center, to my wing commander at the Ops desk, [Brigadier] General [David F.] Wherley {Jr.]. General Wherley turned and -- and read them to us and they were that any airplane within the D.C. area that was tracking towards one of our national buildings or any building, for that matter, that appeared to be hostile were to be dealt with by shooting them down.

DR. GROSS: Okay. And about how soon did you get that?

MAJ CAINE: Caps 1 and 2 that took off at 10:42 in the morning had that rule of engagement verbally. I took off at 11:09 and I also had those Rules of Engagement verbally.

DR. GROSS: Okay. Are those rules still in effect?

MAJ CAINE: No, they're not. They were in effect for about 36 hours.

DR. GROSS: Thirty-six hours?

MAJ CAINE: Yeah.

DR. GROSS: Then what happened?

MAJ CAINE: Then we went into what's called a transitional Rules of Engagement, where there were still a heightened sense of awareness, if you will --

DR. GROSS: Yeah.

MAJ CAINE: -- but it was not a weapons-free engagement zone, like was brought up on the first day.

DR. GROSS: Okay.

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(a)

MAJ CAINE: Under -- under transitional ROE,

[redacted]

DR. GROSS: What does that mean for a guy like me?

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(a)

MAJ CAINE: For -- for a guy like you --

DR. GROSS: Yeah.

MAJ CAINE: -- it means some -- somebody's going to tell me to shoot.

DR. GROSS: Somebody's going to -- but before, you just -- if they threatened and then penetrated that -- what, [redacted]
or whatever --

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(a)

MAJ CAINE: Right, the --

DR. GROSS: -- bubble, you should
(inaudible) --

MAJ CAINE: The ability to shoot was in the cockpit.

DR. GROSS: The ability to shoot?

MAJ CAINE: And under transitional ROE --

DR. GROSS: Okay.

MAJ CAINE: -- the decision as to whether or not to shoot --

DR. GROSS: Okay.

MAJ CAINE: -- lives at a much higher command and control level.

DR. GROSS: Okay.

MAJ CAINE: The -- actually, with -- with --

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(a)

DR. GROSS: [redacted] okay.

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(a)

MAJ CAINE: There's more people you might want to talk to.

DR. GROSS: Yeah, yeah, I've got the name of the Colonel up there who was in charge and even --

MAJ CAINE: COL Dunn (phonetic) and COL Marr.

DR. GROSS: COL Marr, yeah, that's the name I had.

MAJ CAINE: And my parallel folks up there are MAJ Murphy and MAJ Julian (phonetic).

DR. GROSS: Okay. What are they?

MAJ CAINE: They're the tactics guys up there.

DR. GROSS: Tactics guys, okay, good. You were working with the air traffic controllers --

MAJ CAINE: Yes, we were.

DR. GROSS: -- after this and -- so, I mean, they're not used to, sort of, vectoring fighters and stuff like that.

MAJ CAINE: Not at all.

DR. GROSS: How did that work out?

MAJ CAINE: We -- they did --

DR. GROSS: Train those guys?

MAJ CAINE: We trained those guys on the fly.

DR. GROSS: Yeah.

MAJ CAINE: We told them that Reagan -- Reagan National would be what we call a bull's eye.

DR. GROSS: What does that mean? Just the center --

MAJ CAINE: That is a geographical reference off of which a radial, in a distance, would be referenced for any radar tracks.

DR. GROSS: Okay.

MAJ CAINE: So, if somebody is north, we would say that they were Bull's Eye 360 and the distance, so 360-15 would be north of Reagan National -- due north of Reagan National at 15 miles. And they did -- they did great work.

We were able to train them very quickly on how we needed the information in that format so that we could effectively run the intercepts that we needed to in a timely fashion and have an idea on who was who.

DR. GROSS: Who was calling from the cockpit, calling from (inaudible)?

MAJ CAINE: We called them from the cockpit.

DR. GROSS: Okay.

MAJ CAINE: We told -- we were talking to them on one of the radios in the airplane.

DR. GROSS: Okay. About how long did this take before you had this kind of work -- this thing worked out with them?

MAJ CAINE: The -- the pieces in place were -- were -- they started to get the pieces in place about 10 to 15 minutes after Caps 1 and 2 got airborne.

DR. GROSS: Yeah.

MAJ CAINE: They -- we really solidified it probably 35 to 40 minutes after the --

DR. GROSS: Okay.

MAJ CAINE: -- the whole thing got airborne when we trained them and we -- we had them -- we had them doing it. We're -- we're -- I mean, they were -- they were doing good work.

DR. GROSS: Okay. When these other guys arrived from Fargo -- and I understand later (inaudible) maybe at the same time, there were F-15s from the First [Fighter] Wing?

MAJ CAINE: The first people were actually Fargo guys.

DR. GROSS: So, Fargo guys show up and then -- okay. How does this sort of on-scene command -- who is in charge?

MAJ CAINE: Well, there isn't one.

DR. GROSS: Huh?

MAJ CAINE: There isn't one initially.

DR. GROSS: Okay.

MAJ CAINE: The Fargo guys show up and are unable -- they don't have any situational awareness on what the tactical problems were. They -- by no fault of their own.

DR. GROSS: Yeah.

MAJ CAINE: This is just, unfortunately, a shortfall. We had never planned to look inward.

DR. GROSS: Right, we could talk about that too, yeah.

MAJ CAINE: Yeah. Quint, Q-u-i-n-t, 25 is the first set of airplanes that are actually over D.C. and that's the three Fargo air defense fighters, ADF F-16s.

DR. GROSS: Okay.

MAJ CAINE: From discussing it with them, I think they launched under peacetime Rules of Engagement, so they never had that weapons-free ROE piece that we talked about earlier that we had here. (Inaudible.)

DR. GROSS: That's a -- what's the peacetime rules of engagement?

MAJ CAINE: That a declaration of a hostile will also come from that higher command and control.

DR. GROSS: From that higher command, okay.

MAJ CAINE: But at a -- even at a higher command and control authority.

DR. GROSS: Like NORAD or something?

MAJ CAINE: Like NORAD or General Arnold down at First Air Force. Right now, we're in a peacetime Rules of Engagement.

DR. GROSS: Okay.

MAJ CAINE: We heard in the press yesterday that they had allowed two general officers, one in Alaska and (inaudible) -

DR. GROSS: General Arnold.

MAJ CAINE: -- General Arnold to have the hostile declaration authority. That's more of a peacetime ROE.

DR. GROSS: Okay. So, these guys show up from Fargo and they --

MAJ CAINE: From -- well, from Langley (phonetic).

DR. GROSS: From Langley. I mean -- yeah, from the alert site at Langley.

MAJ CAINE: And -- and don't have a whole lot of idea on what's going on and I feel bad for them. They're -- they watch us take off and fly over Washington and they're watching us do stuff and we don't get them up on the frequency with Washington National until we're talking on guard to the different tracks that were intercepting.

DR. GROSS: Guard, what's that?

MAJ CAINE: Guard is an international frequency used only for emergency purposes, but most airplanes monitor either an ultra-high frequency, 243.0, or a very high frequency, 121.5.

DR. GROSS: Yeah.

MAJ CAINE: And I think when they heard us talking on Guard, then they figured out that we were below them in -- in a CAP and that's where we were. Now, as soon as we start building situational awareness, that -- those guys were there, because now we're -- the on-scene commander thing starts to roll in.

DR. GROSS: Okay.

MAJ CAINE: Caps 1 is the initial on-scene commander for around 45 minutes and then he goes back to get more missiles -- to get missiles, because he doesn't have it.

DR. GROSS: To get missiles, yeah.

MAJ CAINE: And then I'll be the follow-on on-scene commander for about the next four-and-a-half hours.

DR. GROSS: Oh, okay. You had to get refueled, then?

MAJ CAINE: Yes, yes, which -- we did refuel. So initially, you have the three air defense F-16s.

DR. GROSS: Right.

MAJ CAINE: You then have us feeding into this -- into this fight. You have us kind of controlling the battle space, if you will.

DR. GROSS: Yeah,

MAJ CAINE: Working with Washington approach, because we can't talk to the NORAD command and control structure, Huntress, because we're too low and we're just too far away -- radio, line of sight problems.

DR. GROSS: So, you're basically running the thing yourselves or --

MAJ CAINE: We are basically running the thing ourselves.

DR. GROSS: You're not talking to NORAD, you're not talking to --

MAJ CAINE: We --

DR. GROSS: -- NEADS or First Air Force or --

MAJ CAINE: We want to and we're trying to, but we're just -- due to pure radio line of sight, we're unable to do so. Now, on the ground, General Wherley -- and -- and you'd have to get that from him firsthand. But General Wherley is talking to those command and control types.

DR. GROSS: Okay.

MAJ CAINE: We're not just Nevada freestyle out here, doing things on our own. I mean, we're -- he's attempted to communicate with anybody he can get on the telephone so that we're not -- it's an uncomfortable thing to get launched from the Vice President and from the Joint Operations Center direct to your OPS counter.

DR. GROSS: Yeah, yeah.

MAJ CAINE: Especially with the Rules of Engagement being to shoot anybody --

DR. GROSS: Yeah.

MAJ CAINE: (Inaudible.) So, those two fighters -- the -- the Bully One fighter that took off will return to base after about 30 minutes. Caps 1 and 2 will fly for about an hour, hour-

and-five. I will not review them and then land to get rearmed are armed, if you will.

DR. GROSS: Yeah.

MAJ CAINE: And then I'll -- I'll be there with -- with the -- with the Fargo det for about four-and-a-half hours and then the F-15s will show up about two hours, 10 minutes.

DR. GROSS: About two hours, 10 minutes. Who refueled you guys?

MAJ CAINE: The same airplane that Bully refueled off of the Kiwi area air refueling track. KC-10 is the airplane that we refueled off of.

DR. GROSS: Okay, okay. During this period of time, was there any involvement from the Navy and the Marines as far as their aircraft over Washington?

MAJ CAINE: Not yet. About three hours into this -- I can't recall if it's Washington Center -- are we running out of tape there?

DR. GROSS: No, we're fine.

MAJ CAINE: Washington Center or -- or my OPS desk tells me that the Navy maybe scrambled some airplanes out of Oceania [Naval Air Station, Virginia]. So, at that point, I had the KC-10 refuel off of the KC-135 that showed up not too long afterwards.

The reason why we did that is because with the KC-10, we can refuel Navy or Air Force fighters, due to the probe and drogue [system] --

DR. GROSS: Right.

MAJ CAINE: -- refueling capability. And the -- the tanker guys -- both sets of tanker guys did -- did great work, both the KC-135 guys, which I believe were Guard tanker but, excuse me, I don't know from where.

DR. GROSS: Okay.

MAJ CAINE: And the KC-10 -- in fact, we drank that KC-10 dry. They asked me what I wanted them to do.

DR. GROSS: Okay.

MAJ CAINE: So, I told them to land at Andrews. They refueled with 500,000 pounds of gas and took back off again and were on station quickly.

DR. GROSS: Okay. When -- I understand -- maybe I'm not correct on this. I understand that later in the day, you started using -- well, let me back up. The people involved here, the pilots, initially were full-time people?

MAJ CAINE: That's correct.

DR. GROSS: Okay. When or did you start putting some of your传统als -- your part-timers into the mix as far as the air crews were concerned?

MAJ CAINE: The -- one of the great things about this organization, the D.C. Guard, is that everybody really pulls their weight. We -- as the full-timers reacted and had to get airborne and -- and start flying, we had part-timers calling in to the counter and we actually told them, "Don't come in," because we wanted them to stay in pilot rest for as long as possible. And the entire first night, which we -- we flew for 60.7 hours three or four days on almost -- almost four days straight, I guess, when you think about it -- all the night sorties were flown by traditional Guardsmen [i.e., part-timers].

DR. GROSS: Okay, starting the first --

MAJ CAINE: Starting the first night.

DR. GROSS: Okay.

MAJ CAINE: Because we had burned all of our full-timers during the daylight OPS.

DR. GROSS: By that you mean they --

MAJ CAINE: I mean, they had all flown during the day because we needed to cover the -- cover the response time. So, the only people that were here were full-timers and they were out flying.

DR. GROSS: Okay.

MAJ CAINE: You can't fly, obviously, all day and night long. So, the entire first night was covered by traditional part-time persons.

DR. GROSS: How many that first night? How many aircraft were up and how long were people up?

MAJ CAINE: People ended up flying up to four hours at night on night vision goggles.

DR. GROSS: Okay.

MAJ CAINE: We could probably get you the schedules. I forgot who --

DR. GROSS: Okay.

MAJ CAINE: -- how many sorties. My recollection, it was probably eight -- six or eight traditional guardsmen that flew that first night from sunset to sunrise the next morning.

DR. GROSS: Probably would be two up or how many up?

MAJ CAINE: Two up at a time, that's correct.

DR. GROSS: Two up at a time, okay. Meanwhile, this was obviously changing your maintenance requirement.

MAJ CAINE: Absolutely.

DR. GROSS: What's happening back here on the flight line?

MAJ CAINE: They -- have you -- have you seen "Chariots of Fire?"

DR. GROSS: Yeah, a long --

MAJ CAINE: A long time ago?

DR. GROSS: Yeah.

MAJ CAINE: Remember the scene where they're running down the beach?

DR. GROSS: Yeah.

MAJ CAINE: And the music is playing in the background?

DR. GROSS: Yeah.

MAJ CAINE: That's how our maintainers were.

DR. GROSS: Yeah.

MAJ CAINE: It was a beautiful study in teamwork, a beautiful study in -- just Americans under duress doing their work. From the time those two airplanes first took off -- this is two airplanes, they are air-to-air configured.

DR. GROSS: Yeah.

MAJ CAINE: And then I took off with missiles with my wingman.

DR. GROSS: Yeah.

MAJ CAINE: They towed all of the airplanes down there to assign to the side of the taxi way and started hanging missiles on everything and had enough jets to support any flying schedule in under -- literally under an hour to two hours. It was phenomenal.

DR. GROSS: How many jets do you guys have?

MAJ CAINE: We are 15 PAA [i.e., primary authorized aircraft]. We have 18 airplanes and I think we have 10 down there on the line (inaudible).

DR. GROSS: Okay. Did they have to start calling in more maintenance people from the traditional side?

MAJ CAINE: I'm sure they did.

DR. GROSS: Yeah.

MAJ CAINE: And -- and传统als just started showing up.

DR. GROSS: Okay, okay.

MAJ CAINE: People just started showing up.

DR. GROSS: Okay.

MAJ CAINE: On the -- you know, obviously, a very non-standard thing.

DR. GROSS: Since -- would you describe what's happened since that first 24 hours or so? How has the routine changed around here?

MAJ CAINE: Well, we -- clearly, you've seen how the routine changes with a -- with an M-16 [rifle] at the front door.

DR. GROSS: Yeah.

MAJ CAINE: But we flew the first night, the next day, and the next night on through -- in 24-hour OPS, so we became 24/7 for -- for, like I said, 60.7 hours roughly.

We -- we stood down for about 18 hours while we got AIM-120 AMRAAMs from Otis Air National Guard Base delivered by Savannah C-130.

DR. GROSS: Okay.

MAJ CAINE: Those missiles were loaded in about two hours by the time they got here and on the airplane. It was phenomenal. We continue to FLY the DCA CAP now. Day to day, we've gotten -- as of last Saturday, that being the -- today is the 20-what?

DR. GROSS: Twenty-eighth [of September 2001], I hope.

MAJ CAINE: So, tomorrow's the 29th, minus seven -- 21st. We stopped flying CAPs to get back to training for our normal mission, which is -- you know, air expedition, our Air [Expeditionary] Force tasting -- AEF tasking --

DR. GROSS: General purpose fighter?

MAJ CAINE: General purpose fighter. And our lot in life, as you know, is not an ADF, an Air Defense --

DR. GROSS: Yeah.

MAJ CAINE: Our lot in life has historically been a general purpose Litening [targeting] pod, a laser guided bomb, night -- night kind of fighters. So, we're trying to -- to slide back to our normal lot in life, although who knows what our future will hold, based -- based on the leadership and the -- and the tasking requirements (inaudible).

DR. GROSS: Yeah. How did -- there's an interesting personnel question, at least for me. Obviously, you had more people out here and传统inals.

MAJ CAINE: Mm-hmm.

DR. GROSS: I mean, were they doing man days, were they mobilized, were they doing AT [i.e., annual training]? What combination of ways did you have to get them out here to help?

MAJ CAINE: The pilots were placed on 30 days, I believe, Title 10 [United States Code] orders. You'd have to ask General Wherley. I want to --

DR. GROSS: Okay, sure.

MAJ CAINE: I think initially, all of the aviators were placed on Title 10 orders through the end of September. I think they've been subsequently extended through the middle of October, but that was so that -- because we needed -- we needed support right then.

There -- we have not, to my knowledge, and -- and Dr. Gross, I -- let -- let the smart people talk about the personnel stuff, but --

DR. GROSS: Okay, sure.

MAJ CAINE: We've not been demobed [i.e., demobilized], or PSRC'd [i.e., presidential selective reserve call-up] -- partial mobilization -- I don't think we have any activation at this point.

DR. GROSS: Okay, okay.

MAJ CAINE: I think it's mostly MPA [man] days.

DR. GROSS: So it's basically voluntary status, the people coming in?

MAJ CAINE: In the -- in the big picture of the Guard, I believe it is voluntary status.

DR. GROSS: Okay.

MAJ CAINE: We've not been activated like Syracuse [New York] or MacEntire [ANG Base, South Carolina] was for Desert Storm.

DR. GROSS: Okay. What's your knowledge in terms of establishing conductivity with NEADS or SEADS [i.e., Southeast Air Defense Sector] or just kind of cranking guys into that? I know you talked about the --

MAJ CAINE: Yeah.

DR. GROSS: -- initial communications problems when you're running those CAPS the first night.

MAJ CAINE: The -- the most effective tool is the fact that the weapons and tactics officers knew each other and were able to get a phone link up and running fairly quickly. I knew that -- I knew that the defense of America falls under NORAD and NEADS and that's --

DR. GROSS: Yeah.

MAJ CAINE: -- their primary lot in life. So, as soon as I landed on the first day, on 11 September, I went into the vault, got on the secure telephone device, the STU-III, and talked to the SOC up there, the Sector Operations Center, and

NEADS and we began to establish some procedures, at least, for how we were going to fly some special instruction spins.

And we put those out the first night to -- to Langley and us and we were the primary users first, because we were all flying 24 hours.

The -- we're still not built to be an air defense unit. We don't have a hotline to the sector up there at -- at Griffis, but we've sorted out the command and control and we have now a STU-III at the operations desk and there's some -- some straw man pipes (phonetic), if you will, some -- some fill-in com capability up there where we can talk to Northeast Air Defense [Sector] via phone line. Historically, the command and control is -- is clearly, the infrastructure is not there.

DR. GROSS: Okay.

MAJ CAINE: Okay.

DR. GROSS: Those are the basic questions that I have right now. Are there any other areas you think -- or comments you'd like to make that we could get into and people that I ought to see, such as General Wherley?

MAJ CAINE: General Wherley, Lieutenant Colonel Skip Denman (phonetic).

DR. GROSS: Okay. Who is he?

MAJ CAINE: He is the AGS squadron commander, the -- the maintenance squadron commander (inaudible).

DR. GROSS: Okay.

MAJ CAINE: An unbelievably talented officer and a great leader. I saw his people do great work and he could -- depending on how deep you want to go, he could -- I'm sure he'll give you plenty of names. I'll let him do that. I can give you --

DR. GROSS: Oh, yeah, sure.

MAJ CAINE: I can give you 30.

DR. GROSS: Yeah. Well, that's all right. (Laughter.) No, there is just me right now.

MAJ CAINE: The Northeast Air Defense Sector people, like I spoke to -- spoke --

DR. GROSS: Okay, Colonel Marr and --

MAJ CAINE: COL Marr and --

DR. GROSS: And who --

MAJ CAINE: -- Colonel Coom (phonetic).

DR. GROSS: Coom?

MAJ CAINE: Coom, Chip Coom.

DR. GROSS: Is it -- what, C-o-o-m?

MAJ CAINE: He's the Vice, I think, of --

DR. GROSS: Okay.

MAJ CAINE: MAJ -- Major Murphy and Major Julian.

Those guys are both my fellow tactics [officers].

DR. GROSS: And they're at the Northeast Sector?

MAJ CAINE: Yes, sir.

DR. GROSS: Okay.

MAJ CAINE: They're all in -- up in Northeast [Air Defense Sector]. I'm sure you're going to talk to the First Air Force people down there at Tyndall [AFB, Florida].

DR. GROSS: Yeah, yeah. I've already talked to Colonel Navin and --

MAJ CAINE: Yeah.

DR. GROSS: General Arnold says, "Come on down."

MAJ CAINE: Yeah, and -- and I think those are the big -- the big pieces there. Obviously, the Fargo alert det --

DR. GROSS: Yeah.

MAJ CAINE: You want to talk to them.

DR. GROSS: Okay.

MAJ CAINE: Depending on how -- if you're just talking about the initial response and how broad this gets, you could talk to Atlantic City. They've been players in the (inaudible) CAP.

DR. GROSS: Okay.

MAJ CAINE: Now, much later on, Richmond, [Virginia] has as well.

DR. GROSS: Okay.

MAJ CAINE: Richmond took our place on the CAP.

DR. GROSS: Oh, okay, very good.

MAJ CAINE: And then, depending if you want to talk to the Secret Service, Special Agent Ken Boshamp, too (inaudible).

DR. GROSS: Okay. And if I can do that, I'll get back to you (inaudible).

MAJ CAINE: Yeah, we (inaudible).

DR. GROSS: -- telephone numbers and (inaudible) --

MAJ CAINE: Yes, sir.

DR. GROSS: -- like that, okay. Any other major observations or concerns or comments about this whole episode, from your perspective?

MAJ CAINE: From my perspective, from an American's perspective, this is a -- this is -- the whole thing is a tragedy. The fact that we were able to -- to get airborne as fast as -- or as we did -- granted, not fast enough to stop the airplane from hitting the Pentagon or did we have the intel to -- to be able to do that.

It is -- it is a -- it was a testament to the Guard and how well everybody did, a testament to our maintenance. They were phenomenal. I wonder where we will be in five years --

DR. GROSS: Yeah.

MAJ CAINE: -- as a country. That's about it.

DR. GROSS: Okay.

MAJ CAINE: This is (inaudible) -- it's a secret, these tapes.

DR. GROSS: Okay. Well, thank you so much. I appreciate it.

MAJ CAINE: Yes, sir.

(The interview was concluded.)

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